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Introduction

For the past 500 years Mayans in Guatemala have lived on the margins of society.
Oppressed since the Spanish colonization, the Mayan has been victim to discriminatory
treatment and forced integration. Guatemala is composed of two groups of people who
are linguistically, culturally, and historically distinct: the pueblo Maya who make up
approximately 60 percent and the Pueblo Ladino or 'hispanicized indians' making up the
other approximately 39 percent (the Pueblo Garifuna and the Pueblo Xinka make up the
other 1 percent). 1 Over the latter half of the twentieth century, the Guatemalan state
slaughtered more than two hundred thousand of its Mayans due in part to this
discriminatory legacy. Yet even in the wake of this violence and discrimination, Mayans
in post-conflict Guatemala are challenging the legacy of oppression and demanding a
place in society.
The purpose of this thesis is two-fold. First its intention will be to understand the
impact of the discriminatory and oppressive institutions of Guatemala on the lives and
communities of the Mayan population. Almost all of the Mayan 'issues' in Guatemala that
exist today have its origins in a conflict that existed decades ago. By reviewing the past
and more specifically the historically discriminatory rule of law can one begin to
critically look at the contemporary reforms, such as the 1996 Peace Accords, that
1

Diane M. Nelson, A Finger in the Wound, (London: University of California Press, 1999), 7.
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stipulate building Guatemala into a pluri-cultural society. This will then lead to the
second purpose: assessing the possibility of achieving a multi-ethnic state through
securing justice for the Mayan population. This will be done first through critically
looking at whether transitional justice was achieved for the Mayan population through
Guatemala's truth commission and then on the incorporation of Mayan customary law
into the design of the state to achieve a legitimate rule of law through justice in their own
terms.
This thesis developed from an interest in indigenous movements throughout Latin
America. Indigenous people have mobilized in the past two decades as a powerful voice
that demands to be listened to. Multiple public events in Latin America that received
global attention, including the Chiapas uprising in Mexico protesting the signing of the
NAFTA agreement, have caught my attention in its grassroots organization and the

message of their cause. While researching Mayan activism in Southern Mexico I came
upon the history of the Mayans in Guatemala. What was most intriguing about
Guatemala was that a majority of the population identifies themselves as indigenous yet
no substantial legislation with enforcement policies has been created to protect their
rights. Also, the extreme aggressive and racist natures of the violations that occurred
during Guatemala's 30-year civil war make their demands for justice one that cannot be
ignored. It seems necessary to explore further the possibilities for the Mayan in
Guatemala to have control over their own communities and live a dignified way of life.
The research in this thesis will help further inform people of a conflict that affects us as
global citizens and also create a base of knowledge about these multi-faceted issues that
can be explored more thoroughly in future research.
V

The first chapter will provide a review of the evolution of indigenous rights and
movements throughout the world, focusing on the specific conflicts and demands that
define each decade and legislation that has resulted. In the second chapter I will provide
historical background on Guatemala's discriminatory and exclusive rule on the Mayan
population. This will allow for a better understanding of their struggles and origins of
many of the demands that make up current activism. The third chapter describes the
evolution of Mayan activism and many of the key organizations and people that are at the
forefront of the movement today. The fourth chapter focuses on the two documents that
have re-defined Guatemala as a multi-lingual, multi-cultural, and pluri-ethnic nation:
The Accord on Indigenous Identity found in the Peace Accords and the International
Labor Organization's Convention 169 on the Rights of Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in
Independent Countries. The negotiations between Mayan organizations and the
Guatemalan elites and the conflicts faced will be described as well as what each
document stipulated in terms of achieving a multi-cultural Guatemala. The fifth and sixth
chapters will focus on two initiatives that deal with issues of justice to achieve a
legitimate rule of law for the Mayan population. Chapter five explains the truth
commission that was implemented after the Accords and its ability of achieving
'transitional' justice for the Mayans affected by the violence of the Civil War. The sixth
chapter will look at in detail the potential for a return to a legitimate rule of law for the
Mayan communities through implementing customary law. Here the information
emphasized in the previous chapters will come together in a historical approach to
analyzing customary law and its possibility of constructing a more inclusive and
participatory rule of law if implemented into the national constitution. The conclusion
VI

will describe the consequences that a lack of legitimate rule has had on Mayan
communities today as well as potential topics for continued research to be explored in
understanding more comprehensively the use of customary law in Guatemala in
achieving a more just future for the Mayans.
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Chapter One
Review of International Indigenous Rights

The quest of indigenous peoples to gain leverage and recognition as a collective
non-state entity has led them through centuries of struggles in order to assert claims to
recognize their self-determination. In order to understand how the status of these
Peoples' rights has changed over the past centuries it is necessary to acknowledge the
factors and strategies used that influenced their ability to obtain these rights. By
reviewing successes and failures within the nation-state of specific indigenous groups and
in the international community the basic issues that still arise today in the pursuit for
recognition of their self-determination can be understood.
Indigenous groups began their struggle to retain their rights in response to
colonial powers attempts to destroy their cultures and take control of their land. During
this time indigenous groups were mostly unsuccessful due to the small populations of
people attempting to ward off powerful nations that were many times their size and
firepower. The 17r1\ 181\ and 19th centuries saw the first attempts at formal legislation
between the indigenous people and the newly formed 'nations' on their lands through

1

2

treaties in North America, Australia, and New Zealand. 1 "Treaty-making with indigenous
people began, in the first decades of contact, as accords between nations, designed largely
to prevent conflict and to solidify alliances."2 However, over the decades, treaties took on
a new role, that of clearing the way for settlements and development and of formalizing
the subordination of tribal peoples to the will of the colonial powers or nation-states.3
Once signed these treaties were typically not honored or implemented. National
governments generally felt free to abrogate the terms of the treaty if a broader national or
non-indigenous purpose had arisen. 4 In the Canadian west, indigenous leaders struggled
to get the Canadian government to even acknowledge the existence of promises clearly
made during the treaty negotiations. 5 The American government also confiscated treaty
lands that were granted to Indian nations in an act of Congress in 1870.6 What followed
these injustices were relatively short periods of all-out violence by indigenous nations
affected by the intrusion of colonial powers and the imposition of these outsiders in their
affairs. 7 These violent conflicts did not have a lasting impact on preventing the national
governments from having free range of the land and exploiting the indigenous peoples
due the immense numbers and power of the colonizing state. Unaware of the similar
struggles being experienced by indigenous communities within miles of their own,

1 Franke Wilmer, The Indigenous Voice in Wor/,d Politics (Newbury Park: California, 1993), 4.
2 Ibid.
3 Ibid.
4 Ken S. Coates, A Global History of Indigenous Peoples: Struggle and Survival (New York: Palgrave
MacMillan, 2004) 178.
5 Ibid.
6 Wilmer, The Indigenous Voice in Wor/,d Politics, 14
1 Ibid.

3

indigenous groups were a very small base unable to fight back successfully during this
time.
With the creation of the League of Nations in 1919, indigenous groups hoped to
find support for the protection of their rights in an international forum. Several Maori as
well as North American Indian leaders appealed to the League in order to obtain
recognition of their treaty rights. While the League of Nations did listen to their requests
they still placed the 'protection' of their rights under the sovereignty of the nation-state.
Their complaints were rejected on the grounds that such problems fell within the scope of
the domestic jurisdiction of the national governments involved. 8

The failures

experienced by petitioning their rights to the League of Nations as individual indigenous
communities led to the need to organize indigenous groups at an international and
regional level who were experiencing the same discrimination and lack of attention to
their causes. The first regional indigenous organization occurred in 1940, as result of the
cooperative efforts of the reformist U.S. Indian Commissioner John Collier and Mexican
Anthropologist Moises Saenz. 9 In Pascuaro, Mexico, forty-seven representatives of
twenty different indigenous nations from the United States, Panama, and Mexico signed a
treaty among themselves to create the Inter-American Indian Institute. 10 This institution
"was authorized to hold quadrennial conferences on Indian life, initiate scientific
research, collect and distribute data designed to solve Indian problems, issue publications,

8

Wilmer, The Indigenous Voice in World Politics, 13-14.
Armand La Potin, Native American voluntary organizations, (New York: Greenwood, 1987) 100.
10 Wilmer, The Indigenous Voice in World Politics, 176.
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and establish technical commissions. 11 This alliance was the first time that Indigenous
groups from multiple nations got together to enhance their ability to influence reform in
both national and international arenas. The Inter-American Indian Institute would
become the model for one of the most effective methods used by Indigenous peoples' to
increase their ability to obtain rights.
Following WWIT, there was a new direction of world order- one that promoted
anti-colonialism, the invalidity of conquest, and the articulation of the principle of selfdetermination applied to formerly colonial peoples. 12 Global preoccupations with selfdetermination intensified and set the stage in colonial and post-colonial situations for the
balance between the nation-state and the individual. 13 The pressing issues that came from
this new direction were organized under the supervision of the newly created
international organization, the United Nations. Initially, indigenous peoples hoped to
benefit from this new organization; however they continued to be excluded from the decolonization efforts. The lack of representation of indigenous groups in the UN at this
time prevented their inclusion in The Declaration on Human Rights and The Declaration
on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Peoples. 14 With their exclusion, both
documents reaffirmed the territorial rather than ethnic character of self-determination in
post- World War IT decolonization. 15 The U.S. delegation objected strongly when

11

La Potin 1987, Native American voluntary organizations, 100.
Wilmer, The Indigenous Voice in World Politics, 177.
13 Kay Warren, Indigenous Movements and their Critics: Pan-Maya Activism in Guatemala (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1999), 8.
14 Warren, Indigenous Movements and their Critics, 5.
15 Ibid., 6.
12

5

Belgium suggested including indigenous peoples in the Americas in the decolonization
program by claiming that Indians had already been assimilated into their respective
national populations. 16 It is not by accident that from the beginning of international
discussion on indigenous rights that indigenous groups remained at the margins of
official debates about self-determination. Most member states felt threatened by this new
category of several thousand potential claimants wanting 'autonomy' from their
respective nation.

17

From their perspective they believed indigenous people desired a

separate state as opposed to the self-determination over their own economies, politics,
and culture. Even with these setbacks indigenous organizations continued to build
alliances in order to enhance their ability to assert influence in the United Nations. Two
new organizations, the North American Indian Brotherhood and the Nordic Saami
Council, formed and sent delegates to the UN to continue to push for recognition of
indigenous peoples within the international community.
The first international recognition of indigenous rights and protection occurred in
1957. The UN-affiliated International Labor Organization developed a draft protocol
entitled Convention 107 Concerning the Protection and Integration of Indigenous and
Other Tribal and Semi-Tribal Populations in Independent Countries. 18 This convention
concerned the protection and integration of indigenous and other tribal and semi-tribal
populations in independent countries. While it did recognize the existence of indigenous
people outside of the nation-state, the fundamental aspiration of the document was
16

Wilmer, The Indigenous Voice in World Politics, 18.
Warren, Indigenous Movements and their Critics, 5.
18 Ibid., 7.
17
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integration into the nation-state and not the establishment of tribal autonomy.

19

The

creation of this protocol reflects the general liberal mentality towards indigenous people
at this time. The nation-state's role had turned from one of exploitative to that of
paternalistic. Although at first this document seemed like a victory for indigenous rights
it in fact was a step back for indigenous self-determination.
Ethnic activism in the1960s and 1970s reached a new height as the efforts of
indigenous organizations came together to aggressively articulate their demands for
recognition in the international community and within their nations. During these
decades indigenous mobilization was at its height, including almost all indigenous
groups, not just those in industrialized nations. Countries all around the world were
experiencing regional and national indigenous movements. Dozens of organizations
sprung up, some moderate in their approach to government and international agencies
and others radical enough to attract attention of police and national security services. 20
Having little or no access to other means of influencing political forces that were
oppressing them, Indigenous groups typically used nonviolent tactics to get their voice
heard by their governments. Direct action and protests focused on immediate issues:
access to traditional lands, harvesting rights, national treaty obligations (or the failure to
provide such legal protection), housing, schooling, or economic commitments.21

19
20

21

Coates, A Global History of Indigenous Poples, 236.
Ibid., 237.
Ibid., 240.
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In the United States the American Indian Movement (AIM), the most articulate
and well-organized of the indigenous movement, led the way of this movement by
offering blunt assessments of the impact of European colonialism and cultural genocide. 22
Protesters occupied Alcatraz Island and Ft. Washington as well as Bureau of Indian
Affairs Office in order to draw attention to treaty guarantees that lands abandoned by the
federal government would revert to Indian ownership. "Fish-ins" were staged in support
of treaty-protected fishing rights beginning in 1964 and the Mohawk of Akwesasne
blocked a U.S.-Canadian bridge to protest duty charges that violated the Jay Treaty. 23 In
1972 American Indians received international attention for the "Trail of Broken Treaties"
march on Washington. 24
In Australia, a 1966 cattle worker's strike at Wave Hill, Northern Territory,
awakened Aboriginal peoples and the country to the frustrations of the Aborigine
population and started a new debate about indigenous rights in the country. In New
Zealand, the Nga Tamatoa (Young Warriors) fought and won a campaign to include
Maori language in education. In the early 1960s, the Inupiat from Northern Alaska
protested the arrest of several hunters who shot ducks out of season by challenging the
authorities to arrest a larger group of hunters. The government subsequently backed
down. 25 Hunger striking Saami in Norway protested a hydroelectric project which drew

22

Coates, A Global History of Indigenous Peoples, 239.
Ibid.
24 Ibid., 142.
25 Ibid., 240-241.
23

8

international media attention to the Saami issue of indigenous rights and identity. 26
These protests provided proof of the potential for political organizing to have their
demands heard by their governments and the international community.
For the first time indigenous groups took advantage of the media and nightly
television coverage that were attracted to their conflicts, "This, in tum, alerted aboriginal
leaders and peoples to the reality of shared experiences and made it possible to mobilize
protesters beyond the immediate district. Local groups discovered the power that lay in
numbers and careful organization, and were soon able to transform largely invisible local
disputes into issues of national concern. 27 While in some of these instances protesting
only brought about temporary solutions, what was most influential and strategic for these
movements was its ability to attract international attention and sympathy to the injustices
that these indigenous groups were experiencing. This in tum created a network of
indigenous leaders that were all demanding for their rights to be respected as well as
groups of non-indigenous alliances that were sympathetic to their cause. As we will see
these networks have been effective means to aiding indigenous groups to achieving
national and international influence.
The indigenous movements of the 1960s created a cooperation among indigenous
groups that was sufficiently advanced enough to start contemplating the establishment of
international indigenous organizations. A turning point occurred in 1971 when after two
decades of indigenous activism, it was unquestionable that indigenous issues represented
26

27

Wilmer, The Indigenous Voice in World Politics, 143.
Coates, A Global History of Indigenous Peoples, 241.
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more than the domestic politics of member states and thus were rightful provenance of
international debate. 28 Shushwap leader George Manual leapt at this revival of interest in
Indigenous rights by meeting with indigenous leaders from Australia, New Zealand, and
Scandinavia with the support of the National Indian Brotherhood and set in motion the
events that would lead to the founding of the World Council of Indigenous People. With
the help of non-indigenous alliance groups and the North American Indian Brotherhood
George Manuel brought local and regional representatives from Australia, New Zealand,
Scandinavia, the Arctic Circle, and North, Central, and South America were brought
together in a global indigenous people's organization. 29 Their authority rested on the
ability to mobilize indigenous peoples around the world in support of a specific campaign
or protest and on the moral power that came from representing indigenous organizations
around the world. 30 Their strategy in raising the profile of indigenous issues was to
convince national governments that their actions were being watched worldwide and that
they would have to answer to a higher authority if they continued with their oppressive
trends.
The WCJP used this method to pressure the ILO to reformulate Convention no.
107. In a 1977 International NGO conference on Discrimination towards Indigenous
Populations in the Americas the WCJP publicized complaints against the assimilationist
nature of the document and demanded for its reformation. Instead of patemalistically
advocating conventional models of economic development, integration, and the
Warren, Indigenous Movements and Their Critics, 6.
Wilmer, The Indigenous Voice in World Politics, 137.
30 Coates, A Global History of Indigenous Peoples, 245.
28
29

10

assimilation of indigenous peoples into national life, the new document supported a
paradigm of strengthening indigenous cultural rights, language, schools, and autonomy in
development priorities. 31 Indigenous groups in the Americas considered the final product
of these deliberations, ILO Convention 169 of 1989, as a breakthrough for their claims of
greater autonomy in national affairs. 32
The WCIP also helped facilitate the Russell Tribunal on the Rights of Indians of
the Americas. The tribunal received forty-five complaints from indigenous groups and
rendered conclusions and findings on fourteen. 33 These findings were effective in the
sense that it brought international attention and justice to many well-publicized cases of
exploitation of Indians as well as other lesser known ones. Many of the cases were then
recommended to the U.N. Commission on Human Rights, the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights and, in cases concerning exploitation of labor, the ILO. 34
The WCIP also brought together many U.N. groups to discuss the issue of ethnocide and
how they can help aid against it. The U.N. Educational, Scientific, and Cultural council
sponsored a conference on Ethnic Development and Ethnocide in Latin America and
declared ethnocide an offense against international law. 35
In 1981, at the last WCIP NGO meeting in Geneva on Indigenous Peoples and the
Land, a Working Group on Indigenous Peoples was created to provide input in the UN on

31

Warren, Indigenous Movements and Their Critics, 7.
Ibid.
33 Wilmer, The Indigenous Voice in World Politics, 151.
34 Ibid.
35 Coates, Global History of Indigenous Peoples, 252.
32
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indigenous issues. 36 This group had two functions: to review developments regarding the
protection of indigenous peoples' rights and to facilitate the development of international
standards pursuant to those rights. 37 The Working Group successfully influenced the
World Bank to issue its first set of guidelines for the consideration of indigenous peoples
by presenting numerous appeals and complaints by and on behalf of indigenous peoples
in areas affected by World Bank-financed development projects. In response the World
Bank changed its objective to evaluate projects with respect to "the recuperation or
restoration of tribal groups who have been, or are being or may in the future be, affected
by Bank-assisted development projects". 38 Many projects have been halted because of
these guidelines. It is not binding; however, it is probably one of the most important
sources of restraint in compelling national governments toward a greater international
accountability for their treatment of indigenous peoples.
The U.N. Working Group on Indigenous Population also tackled developing a
working definition of "indigenous" so that political lines could be more clearly delineated
and developing a summary of legitimate rights and responsibilities of indigenous peoples
within the nation-state. Organizations with UN consultative status, indigenous groups
from throughout the world, and observers from member states contributed to these
deliberations. The draft declaration, first issued in 1989 and amplified in 1990, has raised
international consciousness at the same time as it has met serious opposition from

36

Coates, Global History of Indigenous Peoples, 155.
Ibid., 55.
38 Wilmer, The Indigenous Voice in World Politics, 180-181.
37
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member states. 39 For indigenous people, this commitment has emerged as the
cornerstone of indigenous protest and activism and has exemplified the importance that
tribal peoples attach to securing state and international recognition of their unique and
specific rights. 40 Along with many other indigenous groups, Mayas have been involved
in the process of articulating these issues at the UN conferences. A variety of
organizations and alliances have turned to press for these concerns in Guatemala.41 The
U.N. declared 1993 the "International Year of the World's Indigenous Peoples", although
mostly symbolic of the commitment of energy and resources that the indigenous groups
had exhibited in drafting the Declaration, it did bring international attention to their
causes. This declaration was just signed in September 2007 after more than a decade of
debate.
Indigenous movements have urged constitutional reforms to expand their
recognition, rights, and autonomy at home. 42 The ability to have their rights recognized
within their respective nation-states is one of upmost importance because the law can
actually be enforced when problems arise. In Canada, indigenous groups have
successfully participated in constitutional negotiations on aboriginal rights. In New
Zealand they have incorporated the Treaty of W aitangi into the national constitution. The
Norweigan Parliament amended its 1814 constitution in 1988, declaring it obligatory for

39

Warren, Indigenous Movements and their Critics, 7.

°Coates, A Global History ofIndigenous Peoples, 257.

4

41

42

Warren, Indigenous Movements and their Critics, 7.
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the state to enable the Saami to preserve and develop according to their own culture,
including the use of their own language.43
As mentioned in the creation of the WCIP, the use of non-indigenous alliance
groups can also help in correcting certain injustices. The oldest of these groups is the
Anti-Slavery Society. 44 The society's early concern for exploitation of South American
Indians as slave labor was a key factor in bringing pressure to the ILO to draft the
convention pertaining to conditions of indigenous person. 45 Three other organizations
that have played a major role in recent indigenous developments are the International
Work Group on Indigenous Affairs (IWGIA), Survival International (SI) and Cultural
Survival. Cultural Survival publishes a quarterly journal, books, and working papers, and
funds activist's organizations controlled by indigenous peoples. Survival International
has a more internationally based network and is primarily involved in advocacy.
Representatives of SI regularly attend the U.N. Working Group's meetings. 46 The IWGIA
has spearheaded a radical departure from and critique of the forced deculturalization and
assimilationist policies once rationalized by scholars.
The past decades have brought renewed attention internationally to the issue of
indigenous rights, and to political relations between indigenous peoples and the nationstate. Recent indigenous-rights movements, which have sprung up throughout the
Americas from Hawaii and Canada to Chile and Brazil, demonstrate this regenerated
43

Wilmer, The Indigenous Voice in World Politics, 147.
Ibid.
45 Ibid., 141.
46 Ibid.
44
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awareness. 47 Indigenous groups point to incidents of ethnic violence; make political
claims for reforms concerning land, schools, and legal systems in the language of
universal rights; and work to "revitalize" and to "modernize" their cultures. Even with
the success of international pressure influencing national governments to be just towards
the indigenous populations and their land, the security of these territories and safety of
the culture remain much in doubt in most countries. 48 This section has surveyed the
evolution of indigenous rights in organizing and influencing international and national
forums to achieve recognition of their rights. The methods used and the successes and
failures that have occurred coincide with the history of the Mayan people in Guatemala in
their attempts of reaching their goal of a multi-ethnic nation. As will be seen, they not
only benefited by the advances in international indigenous organization, but were also at
the forefront of influencing many of these changes.

47
48

Warren, Indigenous Movements and their Critics, 9.
Coates, A Global History of Indigenous Peoples, 260.

Chapter Two
History of Mayans in Guatemala

Pre-Columbian Mesoamerica was a heterogeneous region of centralized and
decentralized states with fluid boundaries that developed in lowland Peten and Yuchatan
and highland Guatemala and Chiapas from the beginning of the first millennium. 1 The
rise of decentralized states characterized the highlands in the period just before the
Spanish invasion of Guatemala. Pre-Columbian highland societies maintained their own
specifically regional character while they shared with lowland societies an ancient
transcultural Olmec background and later influence from Tolted and the Nahuatl.2
Spanish colonialism in the sixteenth century fragmented the highland states, undermined
elite control, and resettled Maya populations into discrete county-like units that became
municipios. 3 In response to colonial fragmentation, Maya cultural loyalties and
languages became profoundly localized. From this 21 municipios developed each with
their own languages and cultures.
Guatemala was also marked by an ethnicized and discriminatory rule of law
which has its roots in the colonial period. During the colonial period the legal system
was characterized by legal pluralism: the colonial Ley de Indios created one law for
1 Kay Warren, "Pan-Mayanism and Multiculturalism in Guatemala" (presentation, Universidad del Valle,
Guatemala City, March 26-28, 1998)

2

3

Ibid.
Ibid.
15

16
indigenous people and another for the dominant criollo sector. The colonial power used
the different rule of law through the systems of encomiendas and repartamiento. The
structure of encomiendas allowed the criollo sector to take the land traditionally used by
indigenous populations and enforce the 'custom' of repartamientos in order to force labor
requirements upon the indigenous communities. These 'rights' and obligations of the
indigenous people were controlled and restricted by the colonial office of Protector del
los Indios. 4 The social and legal inequality that came from these different systems of law
was justified on the grounds that people had inherently different natures.
However, indigenous populations affected by these oppressive reforms would not
sit and allow their land and freedom be taken from underneath them. In the highlands
many villages revolted to these new reforms. Rebellions were recorded in Ixtahuacan
(1748), Santa Lucia de Utatlan (1760), Tecpan (1764) and Cohan (1770 and 1803). As
the editors of a compilation of Guatemalan historical documents conclude and allude to
indigenous action in the future: "History refutes the notion of fatalistic Indian population:
the persistence of Indian uprisings since 1524 demonstrates the existence of a significant
number of angry and active Indians in every generation."5 However the small
communities of Mayans that existed during this time made it impossible to drive back the
invading colonial powers. In many instances the communities that did manage to escape
the Spanish were pushed into isolated places with populations that remained quick to
revolt in order to defend their homes and way of life. The indigenous people that were
4

Kay Warren, Indigenous Movements and their Critics: Pan-Maya Activism in Guatemala (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1999), 99.
5 Jonathan L. Fried, Marvin E. Gettleman, Deborah T. Levenson and Nancy Peckenham (eds.), Guatemala
in Rebellion: Unfinished History (New York, 1983), 24.
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17
not able to flee lost most of their land and distinctiveness to the Spanish colonizers. 6 The
unforgiving oppressive colonial period left the Mayan society with deep fractures
between its distinctive ethnic groups and communities whose way of life would be
forever-changed.
The beginning of the 19th century marked the independence of Guatemala from
Spain. It is also characterized by conflicts between the conservatives and liberals in their
"perspectives" on dealing with the indigenous population. Liberals attempted to promote
legal equality through assimilation of the indigenous population. The liberal Galvez
administration attempted to replace the Hispanic system of private courts and multiple
fueros (indigenous systems of law) with the Livingston Codes which reorganized the
legal system in an effort to secure 'equality before the law' and introduce modem judicial
forms (such as trial by jury) in rural areas. Widespread illiteracy and class divisions
meant that the introduction of the new codes would increase the vulnerability of the rural
poor and threaten the autonomy of indigenous communities.7 The indigenous people did
not identify these codes with social justice and thus a selection of communities joined the
conservative revolt of Rafael Carrera.
The conservatives favored the continuation of segregation to support the existing
socioeconomic hierarchy which recreated the colonial 'Rebublica de Indios'. 8 The
reforms by Galvez were one of the main factors of the revolt so that the rule of law could
be returned to the Ley de Indios which offered some minimal, paternalistic protection to

6

Jim Handy, Gift of the Devil: a history of Guatemala (Boston: South End Press, 1984) 33-34.
Warren, Indigenous Movements and their Critics, 99.
8 Ibid.
7

18
the indigenous population. 9

The support of indigenous people and ladino (non-

indigenous) peasants for the revolt of Rafael Carrera in 1837 indicated the distance
between liberal democratic theories of the rule of law and the reality for most of the
population. While both ladinos and indigenous people participated in the successful
revolt of Carrera, reforms still did not sufficiently benefit the indigenous communities.
Indigenous people did not enjoy full legal rights as citizens (as the peasant ladinos did)
and they continued to be subject to repartimientos. While this revolt included both
peasant ladinos and indigenous populations to achieve a change in regime in Guatemala,
the indigenous people were still excluded from judicial and political process of the
nation-state construction.
After the death of Rafael Carrera in 1865 and the victory of Justo Rufino Barrios
in 1871 a new generation of Liberals surged to power in Guatemala. 10 The liberal
philosophy of equality before the law and positivist doctrine became the ideological
apparatus for the exploitation, expropriation and assimilation of the indigenous
population. 11 This era was characterized by the increase in wealth for the upper class
while compromising the well-being of the poor, particularly the indigenous population
which was inextricably bound up with the development of the agro-export coffee
economy. At first the government attempted to encourage immigration of white settlers
to cultivate the land for coffee purposes but then looked towards the vast number of
indigenous people to provide this labor for free when they were unable to attract a white
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labor force. 12 This involved the continuation of forced labor drafts (mandamientos) and
legal provisions for the introduction of debt servitude which gave ladinos the right to
force indigenous peoples' to work on their plantations. 13 This led to the break down of
the autonomy of many of the highland Indian villages. Under a new law the government
was able to take land away if they felt it 'idle' or not being used for revenue. It was not
uncommon for many Indian villages to be sold out from under them.
Positivist and neo-Darwinist ideas of 'modernization' and 'progress' meant that
the indigenous people were regarded as inferior and government policy actively
encouraged their assimilation. 14 This integration was attempted through legislation that
either provided the 'choice' of indigenous people to avoid military service by having a
debt to a coffee plantation or by learning to read and abandoning their indigenous dress.
The government of Manuel Estrada Cabrera prohibited the use of indigenous languages
in government documents or in any verbal legal transaction. 15 The forced labor and
liberal assaults on indigenous communal land was prejudicial to the interests of the
indigenous majority. The result of the little land that was left among the indigenous
population exacerbated inter-community disputes and even provoked state law to secure
their land claims against each other. 16 Not only did the liberal reforms force assimilation
but also led to conflict within communities and the demand for state services in solving
conflicts that were typically resolved within indigenous communities.
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The first part of the 20th century marked the beginning of the intrusion of U.S.
capital into the Central America. 17 In Guatemala this intrusion arrived in the form of the
United Fruit Company (UFCo), International Railways of Central America (ICRA) and
the United Fruit Steamship Railways of Central America (ICRA). The connection
between these forms of U.S. intrusion and the Guatemalan government was most clearly
seen in the period where General Jorge Ubico reigned. During this time the U.S. had
deep economic ties and interests in the area that were creating considerable profit for the
abovementioned companies due to the exploitation of the Guatemalan economy, land,
and people. This economic revolution led to an unprecedented expansion of the state and
of its control over the countryside, infiltrating areas that were little touched by export
agriculture. Ubico belong to the Progressive Party that was built around an organization
of student reformers called "the generation of 1920". 18 These reformers held a traditional
view of Indians for this time period. This view of the indigenous population caused
Ubico to instate a Vagrancy Law, which effectively gave control over the allocation of
forced rural labor. The statute required landless peasants to work for an employer 100 or
150 days a year as agricultural laborers; all those not satisfying these conditions would be

classed as 'vagrants' and subject to drafts for military service or government labor
services. While this law applied to poor indigenous and ladino's alike, the majority of
the poor were indigenous so the weight of forced labor fell disproportionately on the
indigenous population and ensured that the vast majority were required to work for over
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three months a year, enough to ensure laborers for the harvest. 19 One of the leading
advocates of this generation, Miguel Angel Asturias, wrote what became the blueprint for
a whole generation's assessment of the Guatemalan Indian. Asturias' El problema social
del indio promoted the perception of the "Indian problem" and held that the Indian was
"dirty, slow, barbaric and cruel," and that the mixing of blood with Europeans would
result in the decline of the ladino20 • This positivist thought led to the suggestion that all
communal lands be taken from Indians and that they should "transport them in mass to
the wilds of Peten" 21 Ubico's distorted images of Indians due to positivist thought also
led him to believe that they were unsuited to politics. When Indians in the village of
Chinautla desired the formation of the Liberal Progressive Club of Indians to be allied
with his Liberal Progressive party, he warned: "It is not yet time for the Indians to
consciously poison themselves with politics."22 Ubico's highly centralizing control over
all aspects of Guatemalan society lead to many violent student demonstrations and
widespread opposition among the middle class and professionals.
Ubico resigned his post and the government was now in the hands of these
revolutionaries who had been inspired by democracy and freedom that had entered
Guatemala during the Second World War.23 The next two presidents, Juan Jose Arevalo
and Jacobo Arbenz, headed governments that promulgated many changes that positively
affected the indigenous population and promoted a more egalitarian socioeconomic
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vision which aimed to modernize capitalism and the state in Guatemala and involved a
legal order which did not negatively discriminate on the basis of ethnicity. Forced labor
was abolished in 1944 and access to agricultural credit financed indigenous development
through the Agrarian Reform Law of 1952 which allowed over 100,000 landless Mayans
to receive a valuable farming unit. 24 These advances laid the basis for the growth of
Mayan citizenry. Political parties and labor organizations extended their operations to
the countryside, stimulating the development of an indigenous 'civil society'. However,
the extension of the revolution's program of reforms accelerated intra-community
conflict and factionalism between different sectors within municipalities, predominately
between ladinos and Indians.25
Some recognition of differences between the indigenous rule of law and that of
the state was acknowledged during this period. Although suggestions of separate rule of
law was rejected as 'reactionary', special dispensations were provided so that laws and
regulations would take into account the needs, conditions, usages and customs of
indigenous people. 26 In 1946 the government provided for the legal recognition of
comunidades indfgenas and comunidades campesinas as separate bodies within the
municipalities, with the aim of strengthening the democratic representation of indigenous
communities. 27 These and other measures challenged ladino dominance however many
of those involved in the revolution still maintained positivist, assimilationist sentiments
towards the indigenous population and state policy and still aimed to fix the 'indigenous
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problem'. 28 This period of time which spanned from 1944-1954 is looked back upon by
many peasants and Indians as the "Ten Years of Spring".
The threat posed by the October Revolution to the military' s control over rural
Guatemala was a central domestic in the US-backed overthrow of Arbenz in 1954.29 The
United Fruit Company and other foreign investors felt vulnerable to many of Arbenz's
reforms that taxed their products and decreased their influence on Guatemala's economy.
The United States government then labeled Guatemala as a potential country to fall under
the Soviet's communist influence due to their belief that many of the reforms were too
socialist in nature. In 1954 the United States organized a CIA led coup with the help of
Guatemalan mercenaries and exiles and took down the military and sent Arbenz into
exile. The years following the intervention were characterized by failed elections and
intense military involvement in the government. After 1954 the judicial system was
dominated by an anti-communist logic, and by the late 1970s by a specifically counterinsurgent framework.
The first wave of guerrilla insurgency to counter the military dominance in the
ocuntry began in the 1960s in the eastern region of Guatemala. During this time the
insurgents were mostly ladino peasants. From the military' s point of view, the guerrilla
terror needed to be met with counterterror which prompted the 'professionalizing' of the
Guatemalan military into a brutal counterinsurgency army. This highly powerful military
subsequently came to dominate the state directly and marked a new height on the
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tightened hold of the military on Guatemalan society. 30 Because the brutal
counterinsurgency army now dominated the state directly, unspeakable violence through
the use of death squads was being afflicted against traditional areas of popular
organization - students, trade unionists, and many peasant farmers. 31
After a 1968 defeat to the military, the insurgency moved into the western
indigenous highlands. This relocation marked an intensification of the situation between
the military and insurgents as guerrilla groups mounted attacks on military installations
and took over towns which subsequently led to some Mayan communities becoming
central participants in the uprising. 32 Between 1978 and 1985, the western highlands of
Guatemala were engulfed in intense internal warfare. These years would later be referred
to as, la violencia, and whose effect in the western highlands included total destruction of
towns and mass executions of Mayan communities.
Economic growth followed by economic crisis broke down the objective barriers
that had kept the Mayas relatively isolated in the highlands. Different instances during
these years radicalized a number of highland Mayas. Contradictory developmental
influences that raised hopes in the 1960s as they received land from the government's
colonization programs were dashed only to have it taken away again in the 1970s by
powerful army officers. Structural contradictions uprooted and displaced thousands of
indigenous peasants, causing them to redefine themselves in both class and cultural
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terms. 33 These changes and displacements brought them into increased contact with the
ladino, Spanish-speaking world. Rather than 'ladinizing' or acculturating them, this
experience reinforced their struggle to preserve their indigenous identity, although in new
forms- as Guatemalan activist Ricardo Fallo (1978, 546) put it, discover "new ways of
being indigenous." The continued view of the government of indigenous organizations
as "subversive" and excluding them from normal political expression only increased their
resistance in mobilizing against the government. Also, increased army repression against
the indigenous communities in order to terrorize the Mayas into passivity, by the 1970s,
only stimulated them to take up arms in self-defense against state violence. 34 Mayas
expressed their frustration by becoming one of the powerful social forces during the
insurgency of the 1970s and 1980s. 35
Guerrillas extended and unified their operations through an umbrella movement
known as the Guatemalan Revolutionary Unity (URNG). From the guerrillas' point of
view, this was an armed struggle to challenge the legitimacy of the state and exploitation
of Guatemalan peasants by wealthy landowners and export-oriented commercial elites.
They recruited combatants from the countryside and sought support from peasant
populations. In their terms, this was a war of liberation to resolve brutally conflicting
class interests in a country with the lowest physical quality-of-life index in Central
America. 36 Mayans involved themselves in this movement by joining the peasant activist
network Comite de Unidad Campesina in 1976 (CUC) which organized highly successful
33
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farm-worker strikes. 37 This group gained considerable attention after a major massacre at
Panzos, Alta Verzpaz, in 1978, and the 1980 massacre at the Spanish embassy, in which
Guatemalan security forces burned several dozen indigenous protestors.38 In February
1980, CUC staged a massive strike of workers on the southern coast sugar and cotton
plantations. During this time many ladino peasants in the insurgent groups realized their
failure to acknowledge the indigenous populations during the 1960s and their originally
narrow vision of the revolution. Two insurgent organizations, Ejercito Guerrillero de los
Pobres (EGP) and Organizaci6n del Pueblo en Armas (ORPA), spent several years being
educated by the indigenous population and organizing a political support base in the
western highlands (and other areas) before renewing armed actions later in the 1970s.39
The involvement of the indigenous population in the guerrilla insurgency allowed their
issues to surface beyond their own communities and also expose ladinos and those with
more political legitimacy to their cultural struggles and demands. This also connected
some indigenous communities to the popular movement of the struggle for class equality
in all of Guatemala.
The guerrilla military offensive reached its height in 1980-1981, gaining 6,000 to
8,000 armed fighters and 250,000 to 500,000 active collaborators and supporters which
operated in most parts of the country.40 As their unity came together more direct action
by the death squads and military was used to discourage local autonomy and the rise of
the insurgency. Headed by the president Rios Mott, the army began an unprecedented
37
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counteroffensive, titled "Scorched Earth", in the middle of 1981. In the highlands this
strategy was lived out in a world of ethnic difference with the army unleashing a virtual
holocaust upon the indigenous communities.
The goal of the scorched-earth warfare was to annihilate the Maya support base
for the guerrillas as well as destroy the culture, identity, and communal structures of the
indigenous populations. The next stage that carried out what was essentially the ultimate
objective of ethnocide of the Mayan culture (after 1983) occurred through the imposition
of coercive institutions throughout the countryside, designed to consolidate military
control over the population. These institutions took the form of mandatory paramilitary
"civilian self-defense patrols" or PACs; "development poles," rural forced resettlement
camps where every aspect of people's lives was subject to direct army control; and
militarization of the entire administrative apparatus of the country. 41
The military practiced forced recruitment of indigenous boys in order to, as
General Otzoy admitted, " ... get Indians out of their communities, so they understand
they are part of Guatemala." Brutal barracks training attempted to break the boys down
so they could be remade as soldiers and promising them marks of the ladino.42
Anthropologist Diane Nelson found in her fieldwork in 1985 and 1986 that the army had
bombed sacred sites in the mountains and bull-dozed pre-Conquest ruins in building the
resettlement areas known as model villages43 • These model villages, built for the
resettlement of displaced war survivors on the ashes of villages destroyed by the army,
41
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were organized into six Development Poles in the northern departments of
Huehuetenango, El Quiche, Alta Verapaz, and Peten. The next phase involved the
establishment of obligatory civilian patrols (Civilian self-defense patrols or PACs),
directly controlled by the army and involved turning surrendered civilians into the first
line of defense against guerrilla intruders, and in the process served to oblige the
community to discipline itselt44. In the development poles, the army controlled every
aspect of life and all forms of political expression were prohibited.
The defeat of the guerrillas and the suffering inflicted on its supporters was due to
the failure of anticipating the scorched-earth; genocidal war unleashed by the Guatemalan
security forces. The statistics of the bloodiest years of the war renders staggering
numbers: From mid-1981 to 1983 alone, 440 villages were entirely wiped off the face of
the map; up to 150,000 civilians were killed or "disappeared." There were over one
million displaced persons (one million internal refugees, up to 200,000 in Mexico).45
Along with these massive population displacements was the deliberate destruction of
huge areas of the highlands by the burning of forests causing irreversible environmental
devastation.
What were the implications of ethnic difference of this war of liberation and
counterinsurgency? First, during la violencia, unresolved tensions in Guatemalan racism
were inflamed and manipulated. Colonial and modern plantation economies were built
on social ideologies and national development strategies and national development
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strategies that harnessed the labor of impoverished Mayas and kept them poor.46 As seen
in the history of Guatemala, philosophies of racial inferiority, which justified an ethnic
division of labor delegating manual labor to Mayas and non-manual labor to Spaniards
lies at the heart of the 470-year history of plantation economics. 47 The guerrillas sought
to radicalize the poor in class terms, while the army decided to punish them so they
would not collaborate with or join the opposition.
Second, la violencia was understood by all sides as a conflict with strong ethnic
overtones. Many Mayas felt that the government used the counterinsurgency war as an
excuse to destroy Maya populations.48 Both their desire for wider political participation
and their distinctiveness in language and community were seen as political threats by
rightist political groups and the military. 49 Third, la violencia was to have a great impact
on interethnic relations in many communities. The war served as a vehicle for the
expression and intensification of ethnic distrust. Wealthy ladino landowners became
targets for assassination by guerrilla groups. Mayas feared the connections local ladinos
had with military authorities and assumed that military officers would automatically side

°

with those who were identified as members of national culture5 Finally, rather than
leading to a suppression of ethnicity, la violencia sparked a wave of cultural resurgence
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in communities and provoked wider concerns with cultural identity among university
students.51
In the following chapter this cultural resurgence will be explored in the different
movements that developed from Mayan organization for their cultural rights and
protection in the Guatemalan state. This chapter has explored the history of an
oppressive and ethnically-discriminatory state on the Mayan community and its
implications on their respective customs and ways of life. The upcoming sections will
focus on the movements and reforms to recognize Mayan rights that have developed in
the final years of the civil war its progress up until present day. While the historically
prejudicial relationship between Mayas and the state continues to marginalize the
indigenous population in post-conflict Guatemala, their resolve for self-determination
remains constant, as described by a Mayan leader, "(the Mayan people are) a smoldering
element and they will determine absolutely how it comes out in the end."52
And they are doing so through the organizations we'll look at in the next section.
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Chapter Three
Review of Indigenous Organizations: Mayanism and the Popular
Movement

The recognition of the indigenous voice in the negotiations for the Peace Accords
marked one of the top achievements for indigenous rights in Guatemala. It symbolized a
success in uniting the different issues and methods utilized by Mayan organizations in
order to have their needs heard and respected. While the Accords, treaties, and
conventions set the stage for change it is the organizations that created the possibility for
it to become a reality. By tracing the resurgence of the indigenous voice in Guatemala in
the 1970s up until the accords it can be better understood the successes and failures in
how these organizations attempt to create change. An understanding of these methods
can then begin to explain why certain initiatives were priority during the negotiations and
which still remain the top causes of the Mayan movement. They can also help shed light
as to why rifts still exist between not only ladino institutions, but also the Mayan groups
themselves and the setbacks these create.
The 1970s saw the ethnic revitalization of indigenous groups. This era was
marked by the indigenous groups beginning to articulate issues that affected their own
communities and how the Guatemalan state has oppressed their ways of life. From these
dialogues indigenous communities began to mobilize and in 1972 the initiative was taken
31
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to organize "Seminarios Indfgenas". 1 These seminars were attended by teachers, social
and health activists, students, and religious leaders. They discussed "el pueblo indfgena"
in terms of the cultural, economic, and political situation that each experienced in their
own communities. They found that each community had their own distinct problems that
affected them which made it impossible to come to consensus about these issues at a
community level. They instead looked at the situation regarding human rights and the
origins of the persecution and repression at a national level and how they could come up
with an ideology that all groups could mobilize under. 2 While the topics were political in
nature the issues of autonomy and self-determination were not discussed due to a
polarization of beliefs on this subject.
The ideologies of Mayan organizations had taken two broad types during this
time: those termed 'popular', which concentrate on denouncing state violence; and those
termed 'mayista' (or pan-mayanism), which give priority to cultural demands. 3 The
popular movement was based upon the grassroots left and the class-based struggle
experienced by all those oppressed by the Guatemalan government and military. After
the failure of the URNG to topple the state in the 1980s, grassroots organizations with
strong ties to the Left- among them the Committee for Campesino Unity (CUC),
National Coordinator for Guatemalan Widows (CONAVIGUA), Mutual Support Group
(GAM), Council of Ethnic Communities Runujel Junam (CERJ), Highland Campesino
Committee (CCDA), and National Council for Guatemala's Displaced (CONDEG)-
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rededicated themselves to pressing for influential roles in national politics.4 They
demanded social rights, especially fundamental ones such as right to life and physical
integrity. These organizations had been embroiled in a fight against the government and
army and allied with groups that organized against repression and impunity.
Mayans who identify as populares generally have chosen to emphasize the
demands that unify them with subordinate ladinos. This does not imply a "loss" of
indigenous identity but it does tend to involve either a shift in priorities away from
demands specific to Maya cultural roots, or to a difficult commitment to struggle for
those demands from within a predominately non-indigenous political movement. 5 It was
questioned whether the popular movement's concern with indigenous issues was
designed largely for external consumption, and, consequently whether international
supporters might fail to understand differences between class-based and national or
ethnic movements. 6 Many Mayans have found personal and political dilemmas in the
popular agenda and also found other elements of the popular movement as unresponsive
to their needs.
The Pan-Maya Movement gained prominence in the 1980s as educated Mayas
worked to create a social movement focused on the cultural revitalization and unification
across language divides of indigenous Guatemalans. The movement seeks recognition of
cultural diversity within the nation-state, a greater role for indigenous politics in national
culture, a reassessment of economic inequities, and a wider distribution of cultural
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resources such as education and literacy in indigenous languages. 7 With the democratic
opening in 1985 and the concurrent scaling down of the violent counterinsurgency
campaigns, Pan-Maya cultural activists began to pursue their agendas with renewed
vigor. The Segundo Congreso Lingufstico Nacional held in 1984 was a watershed event
in orienting postwar Maya activism toward the nonviolent pursuit of linguistic
recognition and rights. One issue in particular galvanized participant's opinions and was
to provide the rallying point for the pan-Maya movement's first lobbying offensive: the
call for the creation of a unified alphabet for writing Mayan languages. 8 To focus on
such an issue in a country with myriad pressing social and economic problems might, at
first, seem misguided. Yet it is precisely this quality of innocuousness that made
linguistic activism a subtly brilliant tactical move on the part of pan-Maya leaders. To
begin the movement by demanding, say, massive land reform, would certainly have
doomed its success in the charged political atmosphere of the mid-1980s: not only would
individuals have been reluctant to offer support for such a potentially subversive cause,
there can be little doubt that state and private paramilitary security forces would have
methodically assassinated the movement's leaders. Thus, concentrating on linguistic
issues was partially a politically tactical move on the part of Maya leaders, a path of least
resistance in instigating institutional reforms. And it worked. 9
In October of 1986, a meeting of all the groups working on Maya linguistics in
the country was held. At this meeting, the Academia de las Lenguas Mayas de Guatemala
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(ALMG) was founded to promote a new unified alphabet for Mayan languages. The
ALMG quickly rose to the forefront of the movement, and activists were able, within a
span of only a few years, to obtain substantial legislative reform. 10 The ALMG continued
to be at the forefront of the Pan-Maya movement and pushed the ideals of the movement
in these early years. The ALMG's important early role in loosely coordinating the efforts
of many other national and regional Maya organizations has been taken over by the
Consejo de Organizaciones Mayas de Guatemala (COMG), formed in 1989. COMG's
membership is composed of fifteen independent Maya groups working throughout the
country. Its stated purpose is to unite the many Maya organizations, relating their often
disparate projects to a common set of goals as outlined in Rujunamilri Mayab' Amaq'
(Specific Rights of the Maya People; COMG 1991). COMG also acts as the Guatemalan
liaison with the Coordinadora de Organizaciones y Naciones Indfgena del Continente
(CONIC), a group with strong ties to popular peasant organizations. 11
For some, the Second Continental Meeting for Indigenous, Black, and Popular
Resistance in 1991 marked an emergence of a new organization and coordination in the
Guatemalan indigenous movement. For example, newly founded Mayan organizations,
such as Majawil Q'ij, CONIC, and COMG, proclaimed the centrality of indigenous
identity for their political work. They challenged the predominantly class-based
discourse and goals of Guatemala's popular movements and sought to create
organizations more responsive to indigenous communities and concerns. 12 However
many nationally prominent Mayanist leaders shared complaints in conversations between
10
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sessions. While the popular left movement stressed a language of cultural respect and
autonomy for indigenous peoples, the idea of regionalization in Guatemala to achieve this
was troubling. Mayanists held that the popular perspective called for their assimilation
into national society. 13 They also felt they had been invited as observers and found
themselves marginalized in the structure of the meetings, which in their view allowed
only two official representatives of Pan-Mayan organizations in the national delegation. 14
This was due in part to the popular Left being well represented at the congress, with
thirty delegates in the national delegation of thirty-five. The remaining spots were filled
by hurried invitations of "independent" Mayas. Many saw these problems as indicative
of larger differences between the popular and Pan-Mayan movements. 15
Even with this perceived divide in the movements the 1990s still saw an increase
in strength and unity in other aspects of the Mayan organization. The continental
campaign for '500 Years of Resistance', in protest at the official celebrations of the
quincentenary of the 'discovery' of the American 1992, and the award o the Nobel peace
prize in the same year to an in indigenous Guatemalan woman, Rigoberta Menchu Tum,
focused national attention on the issues of indigenous rights. Subsequently, popular
organization in repudiation of the attempted 'auto-golpe' by President Jorge Serrano in
May 1993 provided an increased presence for Mayan organizations in the national
political sphere: in June 1993 the Asamblea del Pueblo Maya (APM) was formed to
ensure and promote Mayan participation in ongoing political discussions to ensure the
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transition to democratic rule. 16 The presence of a number of Mayans in the government
of Ramiro de Leon Carpio (1993-96), such as Alfredo Tay Coyoy as education minister
(the first indigenous person to hold such an important cabinet post) also had an effect of
furthering indigenous demands, particularly with the area of bilingual educational
provision. Official human rights bodies have also begun to indigenous demands
In 1994, the Procurdurfa de Derechos Humanos (PDH) announced the creation of a
program to provide attention to indigenous people. This aims to promote, publicize and
protect indigenous rights, basing itself around the provisions contained in the 1985
Constitution and international legal conventions to which Guatemala is a party17
However, it was perhaps the demands of civil society for inclusion in the peace
talks between the URNG and the Guatemalan government that provided the means to
articulate Mayan demands for increased rights and political autonomy in the broader
process of national, political, and institutional reform. New organizations were formed
during this time to create a common position between the popular and Pan-Maya
organizations. 18 The most important was COPMAGUA (Coordinaci6n de
Organizaciones del Pueblo Maya de Guatemala) which worked within the consultative
body, the Asamblea de Sociedad Civil (ASC) to develop a shared platform for the
organizations. The next section will explore further into how the organizations
represented their demands in the negotiations.
By 1994 Mayan organizations were also demanding participation in political
developments. A number of factors have contributed to this increased involvement. The
16
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first is the return of over 30,000 indigenous refuges from Mexico since 1993. The active
stance of refugee organizations within the national political sphere and their fight for full
citizenship has been a feature of Guatemalan politics since the first return to the Ix.can
region in January 1993. 19 Attention to the inadequacies of the judicial system have
gained the attention of both refugee organizations and the Nobel laureate Rigoberta
Menchu after the massacre of eleven indigenous campesinos by an army patrol at Xaman,
Alta Verapaz in September 1995.20 This has become one of the most controversial legal
cases in the country. Judicial reformation will also be focused on later in the paper.
The negotiations during 1996 on the two final accords in the peace process - on
the socio-economic and land situation, and on the role of the military in a democratic
society- has put Mayan demands at the top of the national political agenda. 21 Insufficient
land resources and militarization continue to constitute the two principal problems
affecting indigenous rural communities. Mayan campesino organizations, such as
CONIC have been active in organizing progress on the land question while numerous
Mayan human rights organization - such as CONAVIGUA and CERJ - have stepped up
demands for an end to forced conscription, participation in the civil defense patrols
(PACs), and the withdrawal of military bases from areas of refugee return. 22
Mayan involvement in electoral politics helps to progress the voice of the
movement. Since 1993 the increased participation of numerous indigenous civic
communities, independent from the political parties, in municipal elections has been an
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important development in this area. 23 Organizations have utilized campaigns and new
NGOs and political parties to increase their involvement. In the run-up to the Novemeber
1995 national elections, Rigoberta Menchu headed an extensive campaign to promote
electoral registration in indigenous communities, organized by the non-governmental
organization, the Fundaci6n Rigoberta Menchu Tum. In the same year, a new left-wing
political party, the Frente Democratico Nueva Guatemala (FONG), fielded a number of
prominent Mayan human rights activists as congressional candidates and subsequently
became the third largest party in the new Congress. 24
While the Peace Accords did successfully bring together Mayanists and Maya
activists form the Let through the ASC and the COPMAGUA forums, the process was
highly charged. Cojti Cuxil and other leaders will continue to work toward an image of
Guatemala as a federation of nations, each with its own government, territory, laws, and
means or cultural development. 25 While the 1996 Peace Accords brought recognition of
Maya culture, so far the issue of alternative state structures has fallen outside the scope of
actual reforms. Cojti Cuxil believes a pluri-ethnic society involves conceiving a formula
"to federate diverse nationalities [and] articulate diverse national identities
democratically". 26 In his view, to govern without wider legitimacy is to risk cycles of
violence, as those who govern seek to impose their system and those who want to evade
domination push for a more radical decentralization. 27
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How does one measure the success of influence of the Mayan movements in
Guatemala? They have organized all sorts of conferences, meetings, workshops,
educational programs, and editorial campaigns. The goal of these efforts has been to
incorporate new generations of Maya professionals, elementary school teachers, council
of elders, and working adults into their discursive community. Institutionally, Mayanists
have founded a vast array of research and educational organizations, linked by national
networks, such as COMG and its successors, which keep groups in touch with each other.
Many of these organizations have local representatives and agents, some have community
committees throughout the highlands. They have had successes with its network of
private Mayan schools and centers for research and cultural programming. PanMayanism has promulgated new languages to personalize identity politics, understand
inequality, and organize across communities. Cultural innovations have had a diffuse yet
striking effect on the terms of debate in national and local politics.28
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Chapter4
Mayan Coalitions in the Peace Process and Ratification of ILO
Convention 169

The inclusion of the 1995 Agreement on Identity and Rights of Indigenous
Peoples in the Peace Accords and the ratification of ILO's Convention 169 on the Rights
of Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries marks the strongest
commitment to this day of the Guatemalan government to create a genuinely multi-ethnic
country through respect for, and reinforcement of, the culture and institutions of its
Mayan peoples. 1 This section will look at the methods used by Mayan organizations to
include their platforms in these documents and the resistance that existed in their
ratification. The two documents will then be looked at for their successes and failures in
articulating the rights of different Mayan advocacy groups and in their ability to "set the
stage" for Guatemala to reach a multi-ethnic state.
By the early 1990s Mayan activism in Guatemala had gained the visibility and
high moral ground to effectively push for national and international legislation to change
the deep-rooted discriminatory institutions of Guatemala and recognize the multiethnicity of the country. From the factors discussed in the previous chapter attention had
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turned toward the plight of the indigenous communities in regards to the historically
oppressive nature of the state and the human rights abuses that occurred during the Civil
War providing a voice with an opportunity to create change. The potential peace
agreement and ratification of ILO Convention 169 was viewed by indigenous activist
groups as a chance for them to gain recognition of cultural and collective rights and to
argue for a state in which Maya communities would have "decision-making power over
their own destiny". 4
The Accord and Convention 169 both attempt to tackle deep-rooted legacies of
discrimination and help promote the creation of a multi-ethnic state. The legal
framework of Convention 169 radically challenges ideas of a homogenous nation through
its emphasis on indigenous rights to territory, to self-determination through educational,
legal, and cultural institutions, and to full representation in state decision-making that
affects indigenous people. 5 Convention 169 constitutes a powerful tool in international
law for indigenous people because, unlike a declaration, the ILO views non-ratification as
a potential human rights violation and member countries are closely monitored on their
ratification status. 6 The indigenous agreement is a complex document that gives strong
emphasis to cultural rights, measures to combat discrimination, and promotes genuine
equality of opportunity. It was also influenced to a large extent by ILO Convention 169
in issues of local and regional autonomy and in its recognition of customary law and
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indigenous land rights. 7 By following analysis of the ratification process of the
convention and the accord many of the same issues that are at stake in each can be better
understood.
Convention 169 was approved by the ILO in 1989 and was subsequently
introduced to all sovereign nations to be ratified into law. Through the ratification
process, ILO member states were required to engage in dialogue with the populations
affected. In February 1991 the Labor Ministry, through Gloria Tujab, a Maya-Q'eqhchi'
woman, began to organize the National Consultation on the Convention. To coordinate
the work, the ministry hired a Mayan activist who has worked with ALMG. Four
regional workshops were held in Quetzaltenango, Tecpan Chimaltenango, Chajul Quiche
and Tactic Alta Verapaz. Ninety-six Mayan organizations participated and for three days
they discussed and explained the Convention. From this, fifteen representatives were
elected to write up final conclusions and twenty representatives were elected to become
the National Delegation. While these workshops brought together different Mayan
organizations they also revealed local rivalries and mistrust of others due to the effects of
the violence they had experienced during the Civil War. While this made it hard to do
work the meetings were still productive. Several people and organizations never thought
about their position in terms of such rights before these meetings and were excited to
distribute this information to their communities. The documents and conclusions from
these workshops were then presented by the National Delegation at a national forum
attended by the government and popular sectors.
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The relations between the Mayan organizations and the state in ratifying the
Convention closely parallel Maya participation in the Assembly of Civil Society (ASC)
towards implementing the peace treaty. 9 The ASC was established as the forum for
indirect civilian input in the peace negotiations between the URNG and the Guatemalan
government. This organization included popular and indigenous forces, women's
organizations, and other sectors including small and medium businesses. 10 Popular and
Mayan groups also worked through another forum, COPMAGUA, which worked toward
consensus on key issues due the differing perspectives from the multitude of Mayan
organizations. They did this by commissioning position papers from the different groups
and creating a common platform to be presented to the ASC. By participating in this
way, popular and Maya groups gained institutionalized representation and the
opportunity to organize their own parallel meetings in a process that might otherwise
have thoroughly marginalized civilian input. I I The addition of cultural rights and selfdetermination was advocated through the COMG.
Both the Indigenous Accord and Convention 169 proposed the ultimate goal of
realizing Guatemala as a multicultural nation. At the national forum the Delegation for
the Ratification of Convention 169 summarized what the Convention stipulates for
Guatemala. The document requires indigenous participation in the development and
implementation of laws that will affect them and promulgates more general participation
in national life, whereas the state must actively promote the maintenance and
development of their difference. The national government must respect derecho
9
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consuetudinario (customary law) and take indigenous culture into account in seeking
alternative punishment for infractions of national law. It also calls for recognition of the
spiritual relationship between indigenous peoples and the land and should ensure the right
to land traditionally occupied by indigenous peoples. Additionally it calls for protection
against discrimination in labor, sanctions against sexual harassment, protection of
religious freedom, equality in education, and access to health services and the mass
media.
The accord provides a vision of a just society and a measure of the substantial
structural and cultural changes necessary to achieve this vision. The indigenous accord
was divided into four parts. The first part calls for the formal recognition of Guatemala's
indigenous people. Non-Maya mestizos historically denied indigenous people's place in
civil society considering themselves to be the standard of citizenship. 12 It then went on to
establish indigenous identity of that of the Xinca, Garifuna and Maya and that Maya
identity is conceived of as having a plurality of sociocultural and linguistic expressions.
The second part focuses on the struggle against discrimination. It was recognized that in
order to achieve peaceful coexistence of all ethnic groups it must be sought out by
legislation to make discrimination a crime, root out discriminatory laws, promote public
education, and secure the active defense of rights by providing legal aid for the poor. 13
The third section identifies key cultural rights for indigenous communities. It called for
the recognition and support of indigenous people as the authors of their own cultural
development through distinctive institutions.14 This included efforts to constitutional
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recognition of indigenous languages in schools, social services, and court proceedings as
well as spiritual recognition. It also advocated for intercultural education and a Maya
University as well as wider access to mass media. The fourth section deals with
constitutional reforms in civil, political, social, and economic rights to make possible a
multi-ethnic, pluricultural, and multilingual vision of national society. This would
involve governmentally promoted decentralization of municipal autonomy that would
involve the recognition of customary law and community decision-making powers in
issues of education, health, culture, and community development. 15 The last part of the
accord argued for the recognition of communal and individual land holdings, the right of
communities to administer communal lands according to local norms, and rights to
natural resources in benefit of local communities. 16 Finally, the accord provided for the
creation of several joint commissions (comisiones paritarias), composed of an equal
number of governmental representatives and representatives of indigenous organizations,
to guide the implementation of educational reforms, other state reforms (including the
judiciary), and land tenure agreements. 17
The agreement and convention aroused sensitivities and adverse reactions from
different groups in Guatemalan society. They claimed that both would have negative
implications for national unity and would promote fragmentation, separatism and reverse
racism. 18 When the ILO delegation presented their information from the workshops, as
noted earlier, all members there supported ratification except for the CACIF (the major
business chamber). The delegation was still able to pass through the first three phases of
Warren, Indigenous Movements and their Critics, 211.
Ibid., 213.
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ratification (due to indigenous awareness in the Quincentennial year of 1992) however in
the final state of its ratification the CACIF began a negative publicity campaign claiming
that the Convention would destroy state sovereignty. The paranoia of a portion of
Guatemala's non-indigenous belief that the Mayan majority would attempt to make their
own autonomous state blocked initial ratification of the convention. The strength of this
fear prevented its implementation even after its planned finalization in October 1992 to
commemorate the 1944 Democratic spring, the Quincentennial, first massive refugee
return, peace talks with the guerrillas, and the Nobel Peace Prize award given to
Rigoberta Menchu.
The most difficult issues in the Indigenous agreement arise in Chapter four,
concerning the entire gamut of civil, political, economic and social rights. With regard o
civil and political rights, the tension is evident between the concept of separate rights and
structures for indigenous peoples and the new structures needed to guarantee effective
participation by indigenous peoples at all levels. With regard to local indigenous
communities and authorities, participation at all levels and customary law, many of the
concepts are derived from Convention 169 and follow the same criticisms. It is the hint
of separate financial mechanisms and procedures at the community level that set off
alarm bells among those concerned to promote harmonious inter-ethnic relationships at
all levels of society. 19
Members of indigenous organizations defended their argument for Maya
recognition and self-determination through the rights given to all Human beings as laid
out by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights:
19
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All people have the right to take part freely in the cultural life
of the community, to enjoy the arts and participate in scientific
progress and its benefits. The dignity and rights recognized by
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights imply the recognition
of the person as a social being, affiliated with a community, ethnic
group, nation, or state at the same time as a distinctive social being

in terms of language, religion, culture, or other pluralizing or
diversifying conditions. (ALMG 1997)2°

After a lengthy nine months of negotiation the Accord on Identity and the Rights
of Indigenous Peoples was signed on March 31, 1995 by the government, military, and
URNG high command and put into force at the conclusion of the peace process a year
later. 21 The viewed success of the document by the indigenous organizations involved is
mixed. Critics assert that the Accord only veiled reference to the issue of autonomy and
that it contained no specific commitments in terms of timeframes or even identification of
the government agency responsible for implementation. The Agreement places more
emphasis on cultural rights and issues which can be attributed to the Mayan movement of
intellectuals and activists grouped in the COMG and CECMA. Some Mayanists also
hold that the accord had limited Maya input and disregard of indigenous norms or
consultation with communities and elders. 22 One issue that the ILO avoided was political
relations between indigenous peoples and states, leaving it up to the state to implement
any of the reforms.
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What the Accord and ILO Convention 169 did was to identify the main issues of
indigenous identity and rights that henceforth need to be addressed through future law
and administrative reforms. To accomplish this, emphasis was placed on the joint
commissions in enabling indigenous organizations to participate with the government in
the preparation of the legal and constitutional reforms in the areas of education, political
participation, customary law and indigenous land rights. In this process many conflicts
have arisen from discrepancies between the broader indigenous interpretation of the
accord and the narrower ones taken by the government. 23 The challenge remains to
examine the extent to which the institutions of the state and society need to be adapted in
order to give concrete effect to the principles of multiethnicity and multiculturalism as
laid out in the accords and Convention. Whether political, legislative, judicial,
professional or academic, all of these institutions will have to face these issues.
The following two chapters will explore the issues involved with justice in
reaching a multi-ethnic nation for the Mayan population. The Commission for truth will
analyzed in its effectiveness in achieving transitional justice for those terrorized by the
violence of the civil war and whether the Mayans are ready to trust the government in
creating effective reforms. Then the importance of implementing customary law as
stipulated by the accord and the Convention will be looked in rebuilding justice and
legitimate rule of law in Mayan communities.
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Chapter Five
Transitional Justice and the Truth Commission (CEH)

To build a just future for the Mayans in Guatemala the discriminatory past must
be re-visited and its injustices acknowledged. In 1994 the Guatemalan government and
the URNG established the Commission for Historical Clarification (CEH- formally, the
Commission to Clarify Past Human Rights Violations and Acts of Violence That Have
Caused the Guatemalan Population to Suffer)-a Truth Commission-during
negotiations of the Peace Accords. The commission was composed of three members,
one being the UN moderator of peace negotiations, the other two being distinguished
Guatemalan citizens. The Truth Commission's work would last an initial six months,
with a possible six-month renewal. At the end of that time, it was mandated to issue a
report containing the results of its investigations and its recommendations for national
reconciliation and promotion of a culture of tolerance. 1 This agreement provided for the
Commission to clarify the human rights violations and acts of violence committed during
the armed confrontation that affected Guatemala for thirty five years. 2
The purpose of the Commission was to tackle the difficult task of achieving
transitional justice for its population after decades of injustices in order to 'unburden' the
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past and create a just future. Transitional justice can be defined as the way in which
"societies 'transitioning' from repressive rule or armed conflict deal with past atrocities,
how they overcome social divisions or seek 'reconciliation,' and how they create justice
systems so as to prevent human rights atrocities". 3 It is also meant to serve as a bridge
between the past and future, reflecting the recognition that members of deeply divided
societies must acknowledge and come to terms with the forces that have historically
divided them in order to build a new, more unified and just society. 4
Truth commissions are also important for enabling society to look at its broader
illnesses by highlighting roles that state and social institutions played in past abuses and
the ways in which the political, economic, and social structures made the abuses
possible. 5 The challenge for Guatemala is to respond appropriately to past evils without
jeopardizing prospects for future developments. 6 The element of "emotional truth" knowledge concerning the psychological and physical impact on victims and their loved
ones or rights abuses and the threat of such abuses which need to be addressed in order
for society to begin anew again.
In the context of Guatemala, the use of a truth commission was necessary in order

to achieve transitional justice. The guerrilla movements were not defeated, yet neither
were the armed forces and both were at the forefront of the negotiated peace agreements.
It was therefore clear from the outset that judicial proceedings would not be a very
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effective tool in terms of sanctioning grave human rights violations. 7 When a nation
tumbles into the depths of a vicious criminal regime, such as Guatemala, rejecting the
principles of human rights and rule of law, the normal processes cease to operate. 8 The
decades of injustices that occurred constitute a huge burden on Guatemala for any fresh
start, so the question arises - what can be done to tackle the past? This chapter will
explore the effectiveness of the CEH in recognizing and rehabilitating the ethnic
discrimination and violence experienced by the Mayans during the Civil War in order to
begin a fresh start in realizing the goals set forth in the Peace Accords.
In order to begin to expose the truths of the past the CEH made it its central idea

that, "at a minimum, victims are entitled to full information about the general
developments underlying the violations that they suffered. " 9 It then speaks of the right of
the people of Guatemala "to fully know the truth" about the events of the civil war. What
this asserts is that no government is entitled to hide the truth about its own involvement in
a conflict, or the involvement of a predecessor regime. Only on the basis of the full truth
can a people learn from the past and immunize itself against the danger of falling into the
same trap as before. 10 The Commission's mandate was threefold: to clarify human rights
violations and acts of violence, collect findings on the sources and effects of the civil war
in a report, and make recommendations for promoting justice and reconciliation in the
future. 11
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One of the most controversial features of the CEH was its prohibition against
assignment of individual responsibility. Human rights organizations originally felt that
this provision would emasculate any results that the CEH might produce. It held that the
official report of the CEH would, according to all probability, be so timid that it could not
make any meaningful contribution to laying the groundwork for a better Guatemala. 13 In
response to this perceived setback an alternative truth commission was established, the
REMHI, to cover the inadequacies of the CEH and provided another perspective of the
past. This organization will be looked at later. The CEH report could not convict
anyone, not even in an indirect fashion, and its findings could not be taken as constituting
the last word on any specific issue. The CEH hoped that by guaranteeing perpetrators
that they would remain anonymous they would be more willing to expose their crimes.
However, this was not the case. Even while the number of victims submitting their
testimony to the CEH was impressively high, the number of perpetrators prepared to
speak about their involvement was just as impressively low. 15
The CEH started a campaign to invite many of the military and police officers
who held high posts during the dictatorial regimes to testify but this was met with a lack
of cooperation by the Ministry of Defense. From this reaction the CEH had to assume
that inside the Armed Forces there existed at least an informal consensus that its work
should not be supported. 16 In these circumstances, it might have been helpful for the
CEH to enjoy subpoena powers. However, it held no such powers. Nor could the CEH
search any premises which relevant archives were kept. The Ministry of Defense also
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denied the CEH information on the conduct of operations during the worst years of the
armed confrontation, when tens of thousands of Mayans lost their lives. On the whole,
therefore, one may characterize the contribution made by the Government of Guatemala
to the process of clarification as next to nothing. In particular, the armed forces pursued a
deliberate strategy of obstruction without admitting to this. 17 Guerrilla forces cooperated
in a far more productive way with the CEH. Whereas the CEH could hold only formal
meetings with the armed forces, at which normally a liaison officer listened politely to
questions put to him without giving any answers, it was able to organize a considerable
number of working meetings with the commanders of the URNG. The guerrilla
organization openly acknowledged its responsibility in some massacres but it should also
be noted that many questions put to the guerrillas received no answer. 18
Based on the collection of over eight thousand testimonies from victims and their
relatives, the CEH concluded that the state was responsible for 93 percent of the
violations and that the military committed 629 massacres. The guerrillas were assigned
responsibility for 3 percent of the violations and thirty-two collective killings. 21 The
CEH also concluded that during the course of the conflict over two hundred thousand
Guatemalans disappeared or were killed. The CEH also identified three interrelated
historical causes of the war: economic exploitation, racism, and political exclusion.
The government's response to the report has so far been disappointing. The
Guatemalan government has not claimed the CEH report as its own. The CEH had
recommended, in particular, that the President, in the name of the state of Guatemala,
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express public apologies to the people of Guatemala for the acts described in the report,
and assume responsibility for the human rights violations connected with the armed
confrontation. The suggestion was rejected .23 Likewise, the government contended that
there was no need to purge the armed forces and the government also declined to
establish a follow-up mechanism as recommended by the CEH. 24 Guatemala's minister
of defense, General Hector Barrios, remarked that the report was "a partial truth, since its
version of history is nothing more than the point of view of the commission." (El
Peri6dico, 26 February 1999).
Not surprisingly, what has been refuted the most by government and military
officials are the findings that the violence during la violencia was genocidal toward the
indigenous population. When the issue of genocide was raised in the Commission it was
met with great debate. Despite the massive violence visited upon Maya communities
recorded by the CEH, the question remained: Was the violence genocidal? In other
words, the CEH set out to find if the Maya were being killed because they were Maya or
because they represented the real or perceived support base of the insurgency? 25
The CEH resolved this question by adhering to the definition set out by the United
Nations' Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. The
convention defines genocide as the "intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national
ethnic, racial, or religious". 26 This separation of intent from motive is a key distinction,
for it permitted the CEH to focus on the acts of ethnic violence themselves rather than
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historical or social explanations (or rationalizations) given for those acts. In other words,
it allowed the CEH to explain, historically and socially, Guatemala's legacy of political
repression without abdicating the moral authority to judge those directly responsible for
individual acts of repression. 27
The CEH used historical analysis to understand the motive that informed the
military' s actions. The commission concluded that military officials drew on deep-seated
assumptions regarding Maya culture to "single out [Maya] as the internal enemy... both a
real and potential support base for the guerrillas". 28 The military's scorched-earth
campaign, therefore, was designed to brutally cut off the indigenous population from the
insurgency and break down the communal structures which analysts identified as
seedbeds of guerrilla support, "The military destroyed ceremonial sites, sacred places,
and cultural symbols. Indigenous language and dress were repressed .. . Legitimate
authority of the communities were destroyed." Maya were identified as the enemy and
killed, even if the motivation was to beat the insurgency.
Government officials refused to accept the CEH' s conclusion that the state committed
genocide against Mayan, instead arguing that the military acted in defense of national
security. Guatemalan president Alvaro Arzu Irigoyen dismissed the CEH' s ruling,
stating that "genocide is the desire to exterminate an ethnic group, and this was not the
cause of the conflict." The CEH's tum to history allowed it to reject such a defense as
explained above. More effective than all the proceedings before the judicial institutions
of Guatemala may tum out to be a proceeding initiated by the Spanish Audiencia
27
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Nacional on 27 March 2000 against former head of State Efrain Rfos Montt in particular,
during whose time in office the worse massacres were committed by the armed forces
and the security forces in the Mayan regions of the country. 29 The Spanish judge pointed
out that facts submitted to him by Nobel prize winner Rigoberta Menchu, showing the
passivity of the competent judicial authorities of Guatemala who were not fulfilling their
duties, motivated him to start an investigation. Menchu believes that it is necessary to
"fully identify those responsible for genocide" and to bring them to justice. 30
Probably the most profound failure of the CEH in reaching justice for the Mayans
affected by the violence was that no consequences resulted from the findings of the CEH
that genocide had been committed during la violencia. The implications are two-fold.
First, the move to hold that the violence that occurred during the war was genocidal
served specifically to bring justice to the Mayan population. If the government was to
follow the guidelines set up by the genocide convention, then those who employed
violence towards the indigenous people, such as Rios Mott, could be brought to justice.
For many Mayas this would help bring closure to the last 50 years of terror and permit
transitional justice to have a steady base for the future. Secondly, if the government and
those involved are not taking responsibility for the discriminatory crimes they committed
in the past, how can they keep if from occurring again? In other words, it will be much
more difficult for those responsible for the violence to leap outside their ambiguous
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relation with death, decipher the repression, read its causes, and work to make sure that
the next hundred years do not repeat themselves. 31
While the CEH' s success was mixed it did manage to establish that facts can not
be hidden for the most part. No one may contend that the accounts of untold death and
suffering in the highlands are just figments of imagination. It would now seem that the
true challenge to the Ladino group of the population is to acknowledge that the racist
ideology that has pervaded Guatemala for centuries has been one of the main reasons for
the ruthless treatment of the Mayan communities. 32 It is a bold assumption that peace
and national harmony may ensue from the revelation of the truth without action. Human
dignity must be restored to the victims in the form of the reforms and demands most
desired by the Maya population. The next chapter will explore the possible reforms to
return the rule of law back into the hands of the Mayan communities through customary
law in order to restore justice in their terms since the national government has made little
to no effort of doing this themselves.
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Chapter 6
Customary Law and Judicial Reform

The Agreement on the Rights and Identity of Indigenous Peoples commits the
government to reform the legal system to encompass a plurality of legal orders:
specifically, to developing the legal mechanisms necessary to afford greater recognition
to customary law (derecho consuetudinario) and traditional community authorities. 1
Recognition of this right is laid out in ILO Convention 169:
"In applying with national laws and regulations to the peoples
concerned, due regard shall be paid to their customs or customary
laws. These peoples shall have the right to retain their own customs
and institutions, where these are not incompatible with fundamental
rights defined by the national legal system and with internationally
recognized human rights ... The methods customarily practiced by the
peoples concerned shall be respected. " 2
Indigenous customary law in pluri-ethnic societies is argued as necessary in order to
reverse historical legacies of discrimination and racism and the first step in the
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construction of citizenship. Advocates and proponents of customary law in Guatemala
also agree in its implementation in order to reach the ultimate goal of a multi-ethnic state
as laid out in the accords. However this goal has yet to be reached with its most recent
attempt of making customary law a part of the Guatemalan constitution being voted down
in 1999. This section will cover the importance of customary law in making the reality of
a just future for the Maya population. In order to understand how the recognition of
customary law mandated in the peace accords will open up the prospect of achieving a
multi-ethnic state for Guatemala it is important to understand fundamentally what
customary law means for indigenous populations and then specifically what Maya rule of
law means for the Maya people.
Customary law can be defined in many ways depending on the context in which it
is being utilized. ASIES provides a working definition of customary law at its most basic
level as 'the concepts, beliefs and norms which in the given culture of a community
denote or define ... harmful or unlawful actions; how and before whom the injured party
should seek satisfaction or reparation; the sanctions for these harmful or unlawful actions;
how and by whom these sanctions shall be applied."3 Other interpretations of customary
law maintain that its norms and practices be widely recognized as obligatory by the
community in question; and that they have been practiced for various generations. 4 It can
also be defined in terms of its legitimacy- that is, the extent to which it is accepted as
valid, culturally appropriate mechanism by the group in question, and its effectiveness at
regulating social action and resolving conflict for that generation. This view holds that
ASIES, Estudio etnografico sobre derecho consuetudinario: informefinal, (Guatemala: ASIES, 1994)
47.
4 Rachel Sieder, Customary Law and Democratic Transition in Guatemala, (London: Institute of Latin
American Studies, 1997) 7.
3
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even if certain norms and practices have not been in evidence for generations, or if their
effectiveness is limited, it does not necessarily exclude them from the sphere of
'customary law'. 5 By defining customary law in terms of the above definitions it
stipulates a return to a rule of law under the terms of the Maya community. In Guatemala
this will entail norms and practices that vary both between and within different
communities of the same ethno-linguistic group. 6
A general overview of Mayan customary law in terms of the organization of their
communities, methods of conflict resolution and definitions of justice can further
demonstrate the importance of implementing this institution into Guatemalan society.
The structure of customary law that will be analyzed for the purpose of this chapter is
based on a field study conducted by Rachel Sieder in the Q'eqchi' community. While
many of the practices in this town are similar to those of other Mayan communities of
Guatemala, for the most part the customs and traditions differ between each ethnolinguistic group. Also, the organization of this community is one that reflects centuries of
change mostly influenced negatively by discriminatory ladino rule. The specific changes
that occurred in the community due to past discrimination will be analyzed further on in
the paper. This is just a general representation of the current state of customary law in
the Q'eqchi community.
Civilian authority for the most part in the Q'eqchi community is gaining ground
against rule of the military that was present during the Civil War. Auxiliary mayors
represent the highest legitimacy in the community and are central figures in community
5 Rachel Yrigoyen, Un Nuevo marco para la vigencia y desarrollo democrtitico de la pluridad cultural y
juridica: constituci6n, jurisdicci6n indigena y derecho consuetudinario (Comisi6n Episcopal de Acci6n
Social del Peru, 1995) 26.
6 Sieder, Customary Law and Democratic Transition, 8-9.
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conflict resolution. Other areas of judicial authority come from improvement
communities, and other sub-committees which are responsible for such things as
education, potable water and roads. Where they are elected, these committees appear to
have acquired considerable authority and are recognized as an appropriate mechanism for
the resolution of various conflicts, often constituting- together with the auxiliary mayor- a
forum for community negotiation. 7
The opinion of the elders has a particular resonance for the Q' eqchi'; they are the
guardians of history and ritual specialists. The authority of the elders among the
Q'eqchi' has generally not existed as a formal structure, such as the council of principales
or the auxiliary mayor. However, many of those interviewed agreed that in previous
years people had tended to seek out the advice of elders in cases of intra-familial or
neighborhood disputes. 8 Traditional religious authorities are also regaining their place
within the communities in Cofadfas and mayordomos.9 The leadership role taken by
religious groups vary within the community and depend on the homogeneity of religion
with traditional Mayan custom.
Community conflict resolution generally emphasizes the reestablishment of good
relations between villagers and the search for means of resolution acceptable to both
parties. This is necessary since the people live side by side with each other and have to
continue to live side by side even after the conflict has subsided. 10 Extended discussion
is used in Q'eqchi communities as the main form of conflict resolution. The dialogue is
fluid; at times it takes place only between the parties to a dispute or within the family, in
7
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other instances with the additional presence of community representatives (auxiliary
mayors, improvement committees, catechists, etc.). Sometimes when the dispute affects
everyone, it is discussed among the entire community. In most of the cases the auxiliary
mayor held the most legitimacy in determining the outcomes.
Conflict resolution is also characterized by a relative absence of punitive
sanctions. Many communities are attempting to construct more consensual modes of
conflict resolution. Flexible solutions to various kinds of disputes are developed through
dialogue and each conflict can be resolved in a different manner. The concept of pardon,
like that of acknowledgement of error is particularly important in customary conflict
resolution. In the event that the offending party fails to correct their behavior or heed
advice, one sanction frequently used was exclusion from community life. 11 All those
interviewed by Sieder concurred that community means of conflict resolution were
voluntary in nature; local authorities had few coercive resources except the threat to take
the offending party to official state justice. 'Respect' constitutes the moral 'glue' binding
the normative order and implies that every person in the community knows their role and
the way in which they should behave. 12 Community identity and responsibility are just as
important as the individual.
However, the abovementioned organization and norms of Maya customary law
are not as cohesive and harmonious in practice as described. Conflicts throughout
Guatemala's past in excluding Mayans have led to many changes in the Mayan
community. Since the Spanish colonization of Guatemala, the Maya population has

11

12
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struggled with living under a rule of law that is discriminatory and fundamentally
different from their own. The legacy of ladino rule has drastically changed the Maya
community by altering traditional judicial customs and powers of command. The late
1970s and most of the 1980s saw violence against indigenous communities at its peak.
State law in the form of organized terror- penetrated and shaped many spheres of
indigenous life, challenging customs and imposing limits on customary practices,
destroying much of what previously constituted 'customary law' . 13 The civil war not
only shattered communities but also deeply ingrained a sense of fear and distrust of
authority caused by the abusive power used by counter-insurgent forces against the
Mayas. In understanding the practices of customary law in Mayan communities today it
is necessary to understand the effects of violence and civil war that was imparted on the
Maya populations. It has been noted that, "repression and resistance generated at the
national level are often inserted into the local reality in culturally specific ways." 14
Civil patrols (PACs) have greatly influenced the organization and dynamics of
power in the Maya community. Before 1985, local justice was officially administered by
the municipal mayors, who functioned as justices of peace. The 1985 Constitution
removed this statutory function from the mayors and created a series of district courts,
each to cover two or more municipalities. 15 Due to lack of resources, a majority of
municipalities had no justices of peace that resulted in domination in power by military
and paramilitary structures. Counterinsurgency mechanisms gave considerable power to

13
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certain individuals within rural communities who were named PACs or military
commissioners. These authorities were not selected by the communities themselves but
imposed from outside. 16 The military commissioners were widely feared within the
communities and intervened in local conflicts even though their power derived directly
from their military connections rather than any consensus on behalf of the community.
During the most acute period of militarization the authority of auxiliary mayors was
weakened (many direct victims of the violence) and the center of local power was located
in the military rather than the community. Even after the conflict, in a number of
instances the ex-chief of the civil patrol had been elected as auxiliary mayor and in others
ex-military commissioners continue to exercise considerable authority over the mayor or
within the local improvement committees. 17
The elders ' authority was considerably reduced during the civil war when their
influence was supplanted by the military commissioners and civil patrol chiefs. Many
elders died during the violence of the early 1980s and traditional ritual observances were
severely disrupted. As one elder put it: "With the war, we lost our memory." 18 Within
the military camps and the controlled territories, the counter-insurgency strategy was to
destroy elders' authority within the community. By breaking the hierarchy of power,
they were able to dissolve traditional ties of authority and rule of law.
The effects of military influence over forms of conflict resolution in the Mayan
community have impacted its effective functioning. During the 1980s the role of the
military was the decisive body in conflicts within the community. Some members of the

16
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community who had links to the military would use this 'strategic use of law' to employ
this 'strategic resource' and petition the army directly to intervene in their favor. 19 The
forms in which the military dispensed were in a highly authoritarian fashion. One
interviewee from Sajacoc remembered: "the (military) base forced us to go to them if we
had a problem, but all they ever did was threaten people so that they would stop making
problems ... that was the only solution they gave, but that is not the solution."20
The tradition of moral sanction was replaced by physical punishment. The
hardening of sanctions has been signaled by some authors as a sign of loss of consensus
in the community. 21 In the region of Alta Verapaz, during a period of acute divisions
among community members, the idea of punitive sanctions undoubtedly gained currency,
fomented by the military's counter-insurgency strategy. The concept of respect was also
acutely disarticulated by "La Violencia". Many teachings traditionally passed from one
generation to another were no longer transmitted because of displacement, separation or
the death of family members. 22 Counter-insurgency mechanisms and the experience of
living within military camps damaged preexisting behavioral codes. The custom of
machismo began to take hold which has led many younger generations to no longer pay
attention to the elders because they value western education above traditional oral
history. 23 In other instances, the experience of military service has radical! y changed
their outlook and behavior. 24
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The decades of violence also has left a mark of fear on the Mayan communities.
When 'justice' was defined by mass killings and kidnappings, the perceptions of those
with judicial power became skewed. The civil war has also affected legal concepts
within indigenous communities. The notion of 'truth' became a highly contingent one
during the periods of acute violence and terror, when 'not knowing' became a means of
ensuring individual and community survival. 25 For victims, the world has become a more
punitive and less predictable place. One of the effects of terror is the destruction of
networks of stable expectations concerning what other people will do which lie at the
core of any set of organized human relationships. 26
Discrimination within the state courts has also further excluded the Mayan
population from a just rule of law. When conflict cannot be resolved within the
community or the resources are not available to do so it is taken to the state level. In
many instances of cases that were directed towards the judicial system (homicides,
serious physical harm to people or property and land conflicts) many of those interviewed
acknowledged that this was not always particularly desirable or efficient, given that
externally imposed solutions generally failed to provide restitution or compensation to
the offended party. 27 Perceptions of the deficiencies of the national judicial system are
widespread. State legal authorities are seen as inefficient or corrupt.
For many, recourse to state justice often meant the complication of a problem
rather than its resolution. Solutions administered by the national judicial system-fines or
imprisonment- were generally contrasted with more considered and consensual forms of
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resolution within the community. 28 Barriers of illiteracy and monolinguism also are
further disincentives to seeking redress within the national legal system.

Many Mayan

peoples feel alienated from the state legal system due to experiences of discrimination
and racism.
The demand for official constitutional recognition of customary law and reform in
the judicial system as laid out by the Peace Accords and JLO Convention 169 implies the
state's acceptance of the indigenous peoples' right to resolve conflict within their broader
framework of a multicultural state. The realization of this goal lays the (groundwork) for
huge advancements in the reality for a multi-ethnic state but also presents a multitude of
difficult challenges to overcome. The general functions and history of the rule of law in
the Mayan community has been looked at to make more understandable the argument
from Maya organizations in advocating for its role in the Guatemalan constitution. The
rule of law in Guatemala is marked by a powerful military and civilian elite that act with
impunity and operate 'above the law'. This has had a profound effect on the perceptions
of justice for those who are at the other end of the spectrum with few rights and multiple
obligations to this unjustified rule of law. To the extent that fundamental rights, such as
the right to life, are not protected and obligations, such as being sanctioned for a crime,
are not enforced, the 'rule of law' will remain intangible. 29 A rule of law that is
legitimate in the eyes of those most affected by the impunity of the current judicial
institutions is central to the success of obtaining a pluri-ethnic and just society for the
Mayans.
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With this argument advocates contend that an undifferentiated rule of law is
insufficient to secure justice. Addressing discrimination within a democratic framework
requires special or exceptional rights and mechanisms for group representation. 30 Legal
orders are vehicles for the creation, affirmation and contestation of national identities and
in changing an exclusionary rule of law to a more inclusive one. Recognition of ethnic
legal rights can aid in reversing historical legacies of discrimination and be the first step
to a more inclusive and participatory role for Mayans in society. This process excludes
strategies of integration of the Mayan majority into traditionally dominant forms of rule
of law and involves the construction of institutions which decentralize power and enable
different groups to coexist on equal terms while maintaining their own customs.
This will involve a profound process of national reform affecting indigenous and
non-indigenous alike. While international jurisprudence increasingly recognizes the right
of indigenous people to use their customary law within the framework of a multicultural
state (ILO Conv. 169, UN Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples and the
Peace Accords), it remains highly contentious within the Guatemalan national structure.
Reform of the current rule of law will involve addressing the deficiencies of the existing
judicial system and tackling the problem of impunity in the context of differing
cultures. 31 As will be seen in the few successes and continuing failures of implementing
reform into the constitution, this task is highly complex with little budging from the
Guatemalan elite.
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To date, the 1996 Peace Accords and ILO's Convention No. 169 represent the
only recognition of customary law in a legally binding manner. However both cannot be
implemented into society until legislation is signed into the Guatemalan constitution. As
seen in the previous chapter the convention and accords were extremely controversial and
when signed both were a huge step in the direction of creating a multi-ethnic state in
Guatemala. On October 12, 1992 Majawil Q'il published demands, calling for "state
recognition of our laws, but recognition through respect, not with pity or patemalism." 32
The juridical section of COMG's "Specific Rights on the Pueblo Maya," also demanded
legal recognition of Mayan languages, the administration of justice in those languages,
and recognition, respect, and promotion of derecho consuetudinario, which "regulates the
daily lives of the Maya today." These supporters admit that attempts to fully assimilate
the indigenous population have failed and that attention to and juridical legitimation of
"their way of doing things" is merely accepting the reality of the multicultural country. 33
ASIES conducted a study titled, "Basic Investigations of Customary Law in Three MayaSpeaking Communities of Guatemala" and concluded that the systematic study of the
legal and protolegal systems of the indigenous cultures and societies and of their
knowledge must be understood and coordinated with the 'national legal system' in ways
that are less ethnocentric and more just. 34 The study was presented as vital for all
members of the legal, legislative, executive, academic, bureaucratic, and public servant
communities as well as the population at large, in order to create "a juridicial system
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congruent with the cultural, linguistic, and ethnic diversity of the country and that
restores justice to interethnic relations in Guatemala". 35
The Peace Accords promised constitutional recognition of indigenous customary
law together with the development of a pluri-cultural justice system which would include
a greater role for alternative forms of dispute resolution in general. In September 1997
Congress passed a series of amendments to the 1994 Penal Procedures Code which aimed
to promote greater use of alternative dispute resolution mechanisms, such as conciliation
and mediation. While the original proposal recognized Mayan peoples' rights to exercise
their customary law, as demanded by Maya activists, it was then watered down to affect
less change. Congress altered this proposal so that rather than recognizing existing
community-level institutions and practices for dispute resolution, it superimposed a new,
officially sanctioned form of 'community court' in a few Mayan municipalities with
negligible prior consultation with the communities concerned. 37 In 1998 the Commission
for Strengthening Justice, created by the Peace Accords, also recommended constitutional
recognition of customary law and the elaboration of a law to establish mechanisms of
coordination between state law and customary law. 38 Proposals that were put forward by
COPMAGUA for constitutional reform to recognize a special jurisdiction for customary
law were ignored by the PAN administration of Alvaro Arzu which opposed any reform
of Article 203 (stating that only state courts could exercise legal jurisdiction).39
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At a local level, the revival of customary legal practices throughout different
parts of the country during the 1990s and the promotion of 'Mayan law' by certain
Mayan organizations drew on the language of historical continuity and tradition. 40 The
attempts by local and national indigenous activists to reconstruct communities and
rebuild identities that been altered drastically due to the decades of violence were most
strongly defended in communities that had been affected most by war. 41 Some of these
communities have begun to recognize both 'formal' (alcaldes auxiliares, comites promejorarniento, alcaldfas municipales) and informal (council of elders, etc) to deal with
offenses within the community.42 This reconfiguration recognizes and affirms customary
policy. Other advances include the increased number of translators in the court system,
allowing greater access to judicial services for indigenous people.
The coordination of customary law and state law is complicated by the fact that
state law is dominated by ladinos and customary law by indigenous people. Integrating
these two systems, given the history of discrimination, will take great ingenuity and
understanding if not to create greater conflict.43 The conclusion will explore the
implications that have come from a lack of effective reform across Guatemala in
including institutions to bridge the gap between customary and state law. Since the
traditional experience of most indigenous people in the judicial systems is discriminatory
and ineffective, they are pushed to resort to increasingly extreme measures of securing
justice by any other measures. This paper will conclude by reviewing current issues of
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violence occurring in indigenous communities due to a lack of legitimacy of law and of
potential reforms for a more inclusive and culturally sensitive legal system.

Conclusion

In a recent case in the department of Totonicapan, indigenous inhabitants of the

village of Chuanoj formed their own 'popular tribunal' composed of the elders of the
village and the auxiliary mayors, basing their claims to exercise jurisdiction on the
collective rights of indigenous communities to judge misdemeanors on the basis of their
own customs and practices. The tribunal found two young men, one of whom was a
minor, guilty of robbery. The youths were forcibly detained and then sentenced by their
fellow villagers to pay a substantial fine and be permanently expelled from the
community. Following an official complaint by the mother of one of the detainees to the
Human Rights office, agents of the state judiciary condemned the act as one of illegal
detention and abuse of the youths' individual rights, and mounted a subsequent police
operation involving over 200 agents to free them, leading to angry confrontations with
the villagers. 1 In October of 1997, five people accused of robbery were forcibly taken
from a local police station, lynched and burnt to death by a crowed of approximately a
thousand villagers in San ldisdro, Comitancillo, department of San Marcos. Press reports
stated that the villagers (and their five auxiliary mayors, who allegedly led the attack) had
no faith in the ability of the local courts to affect justice.2
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While both these cases require further investigation into the specific
circumstances it can be hypothesized that the lack of a legitimate rule of law is at its
roots. Unless effective and culturally sensitive mechanisms to resolve conflicts are found
instances like those above may occur more frequently. The increasing violence in
Guatemala demands that future research needs to be explored in creating multi-cultural
institutions of law. A proposed idea whose effects are worth exploring further is the use
of mixed courts (as proposed in Ecuador as jurados escabinados) to hear appeals in cases
where parties maintain their human rights have been violated by customary law
procedures. These courts could include state judges and either members of the
community in question or Mayan legal professionals. The probability for discriminatory
rulings will decrease and the legitimacy of the process will be respected by all parties.

In regards to the other issues introduced in this thesis that are barriers to
Guatemala achieving a multi-ethnic nation and dignified life for the Mayan people more
exploration is needed for specific issues. The effects of the failed CEH commission could
be further explored on communities and their ability to come to terms with the
violence and how this has affected their ability in rebuilding local ethics and morality.
The plethora of negative effects of the counter-insurgency on the Mayan community and
its influence in aspects other than judicial institutions would be relevant for
understanding the impacts of future reform. Exploring further into the other obligations

.J.
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of the indigenous accord as well as other accords such as the socio-economic accord
would provide further insight into the challenges that lay ahead for Guatemala in
reaching a multi-ethnic nation. This thesis has also introduced the conflicts that exist
between the indigenous groups of Guatemala. The dynamics of these issues could be
further researched in how it has positively and negatively affected current initiatives of
reform.
The fundamental conflicts that have arisen in Guatemala over ethnicity and the
country's attempts at transforming its institutions to be multi-cultural can frame similar
conflicts in other countries. The structure of the multi-ethnic society in Latin America is
uncharted terrain. 2 The successes and failures of policies and reforms that result from
Guatemala's re-conceptualization of itself as a multi-ethnic society can be used as a
template for other nations attempting the same changes. The future of the Mayans in
Guatemala will have implications that exceed their own boundaries.
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